openspec-apply-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon external data provided by the
openspecCLI output. - Ingestion points: The agent is explicitly instructed to parse
contextandoperationGuidancefields from the JSON output ofopenspec instructions apply --json. It also reads multiple files listed in thecontextFilesarray returned by the CLI. - Boundary markers: The instructions mention keeping these fields separate from CLI-returned state and completion criteria, and treating them as "prompt-level behavior contracts." However, there are no structural delimiters (like XML tags or specific markdown blocks) to prevent the ingested data from containing instructions that override the agent's primary goals.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute
openspecCLI commands via Bash and modify local files (e.g., marking tasks as complete in markdown files). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of the
contextorguidancefields before they are adopted as instructions by the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands by interpolating variables such as
<name>(change name) and<id>(store ID) into bash command strings (e.g.,openspec status --change "<name>" --json --store "<id>"). While the instructions recommend using double quotes around these values, a malicious user or a compromised project configuration providing a specially crafted name could attempt to inject additional shell arguments or command segments.
Audit Metadata