openspec-apply-change

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon external data provided by the openspec CLI output.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is explicitly instructed to parse context and operationGuidance fields from the JSON output of openspec instructions apply --json. It also reads multiple files listed in the contextFiles array returned by the CLI.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions mention keeping these fields separate from CLI-returned state and completion criteria, and treating them as "prompt-level behavior contracts." However, there are no structural delimiters (like XML tags or specific markdown blocks) to prevent the ingested data from containing instructions that override the agent's primary goals.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute openspec CLI commands via Bash and modify local files (e.g., marking tasks as complete in markdown files).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of the context or guidance fields before they are adopted as instructions by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands by interpolating variables such as <name> (change name) and <id> (store ID) into bash command strings (e.g., openspec status --change "<name>" --json --store "<id>"). While the instructions recommend using double quotes around these values, a malicious user or a compromised project configuration providing a specially crafted name could attempt to inject additional shell arguments or command segments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 06:51 AM