openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the local repository and instructs the agent to follow guidance contained within that data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches data via
openspec instructions archive --json(Step 1),openspec status --json(Step 2),tasks.md(Step 3), andopenspec instructions specs --json(Step 4). Fields likecontext,operationGuidance, andrulesare directly ingested into the prompt context. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or warnings to the model to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in these external sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
openspecCLI tool, can perform file system operations (mkdir,mv), and can trigger theopenspec-sync-specsworkflow. - Sanitization: Absent. The instructions explicitly direct the agent to "read and consider" the external context and "follow entries" of the guidance, which increases the likelihood of the agent obeying injected instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute variousopenspecCLI commands and standard file system utilities likemkdirandmv. While these are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of archiving changes, they represent the capability set that could be abused via prompt injection.
Audit Metadata