openspec-propose

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data returned by the openspec CLI, such as artifact instructions, rules, and templates. This data acts as an ingestion point for potentially untrusted instructions if a user connects the tool to an attacker-controlled store or repository.
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved from openspec instructions <artifact-id> --json and content of dependency files read from the local file system.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly tell the agent that the instruction field is "authoritative guidance," which may lead the agent to follow malicious commands embedded in the data without sufficient isolation.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of openspec subcommands via Bash and writing content to the project's file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the instructions or templates retrieved from the CLI tool.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains logic to invoke specific skills or commands based on the content of the instruction field retrieved at runtime. While these calls are limited to the openspec:* namespace, the behavior is determined by external data rather than static instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands via the openspec CLI. Although restricted to a specific tool scope in the frontmatter, it handles user-provided inputs such as change names and schema names which are interpolated into shell commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 03:03 PM