openspec-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data returned by the
openspecCLI, such as artifact instructions, rules, and templates. This data acts as an ingestion point for potentially untrusted instructions if a user connects the tool to an attacker-controlled store or repository. - Ingestion points: Data retrieved from
openspec instructions <artifact-id> --jsonand content of dependency files read from the local file system. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly tell the agent that the
instructionfield is "authoritative guidance," which may lead the agent to follow malicious commands embedded in the data without sufficient isolation. - Capability inventory: Execution of
openspecsubcommands via Bash and writing content to the project's file system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the instructions or templates retrieved from the CLI tool.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains logic to invoke specific skills or commands based on the content of the
instructionfield retrieved at runtime. While these calls are limited to theopenspec:*namespace, the behavior is determined by external data rather than static instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands via the
openspecCLI. Although restricted to a specific tool scope in the frontmatter, it handles user-provided inputs such as change names and schema names which are interpolated into shell commands.
Audit Metadata