openspec-propose

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands using the openspec CLI, incorporating variables derived from user input.
  • Evidence: Commands such as openspec new change "<name>" and openspec status --change "<name>" in SKILL.md use the <name> variable. The skill mitigates this risk by instructing the agent to derive a kebab-case version of the user's description.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted JSON data from external CLI calls and uses it to direct the agent's behavior, creating a vulnerability to indirect instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Output from openspec instructions <artifact-id> --change "<name>" --json and openspec status --change "<name>" --json in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is instructed to follow the instruction field directly.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash(openspec:*) tool and file system write capabilities via resolvedOutputPath.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or filtering for the content of the instruction or context fields before processing.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions allow the agent to execute arbitrary skills or commands if directed by the output of the CLI tool.
  • Evidence: Step 5a in SKILL.md states: "If the instruction field delegates creation to a specific skill or command, invoke it to produce the artifact instead of writing the file yourself". This allows runtime determination of executed commands by the external tool's output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 06:56 AM