openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external project files and CLI outputs which could contain malicious instructions meant to subvert the agent's workflow.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the output of
openspec instructions archive --json(specifically thecontextandoperationGuidancefields) and parses the content of thetasks.mdfile. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit guardrails, telling the agent to keep external guidance separate from built-in steps, treat it as advisory, and report/ignore conflicts with the core workflow.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via the
Bashtool, including moving directories and executing theopenspecCLI. - Sanitization: There is no technical sanitization (e.g., HTML escaping or regex filtering) described, relying instead on the agent's ability to follow logic-based conflict resolution instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and executes shell commands using variables derived from project metadata and user input.
- Evidence: The skill uses variables like
<name>,<changeRoot>, and<planningHome.changesDir>inside shell command templates (e.g.,mv "<changeRoot>" "<planningHome.changesDir>/archive/<target-name>"). While the instructions suggest using double quotes, this pattern presents a surface for command injection if the underlying data sources or user-provided names are not properly sanitized by the agent platform.
Audit Metadata