openspec-propose

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads instructions, context, and rules from external sources, specifically the output of shell commands (openspec instructions) and existing project files (e.g., proposal.md, specs/spec.md). If these files or the tool output contain malicious instructions, the agent may follow them as they are treated as project constraints.
  • Ingestion points: Relative artifact paths on disk and the JSON output from openspec instructions subcommands.
  • Boundary markers: The skill provides textual instructions to use fields as constraints and avoid copying them, but lacks robust delimiters to wrap the untrusted content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute openspec subcommands via the Bash tool and write files to the project directory.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation of the text content ingested from these external files or command outputs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill builds shell commands for the openspec CLI by interpolating user-provided or agent-derived variables like <name>, <schema-name>, and <store-id>. While the agent is instructed to normalize these into kebab-case, raw user input could theoretically be used for command injection, though the impact is restricted by the allowed-tools filter which only permits openspec:* commands.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow allows the instruction field in the openspec JSON response to dynamically delegate artifact creation to a specific skill or command. This pattern means the agent may execute different subcommands based on data provided at runtime from the project environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 06:55 AM