omniroute-cli-providers
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to download and install the
omnirouteCLI from a repository atgithub.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute. This repository is not a recognized trusted source, posing a risk of unverifiable third-party code execution. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documentation includes the command
omniroute keys reveal <id>, which allows for the extraction of full API key values. While this is a functional feature of the documented CLI, it provides a direct mechanism for an agent to expose sensitive credentials if misdirected. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is entirely composed of shell commands that interact with system configuration, network connections, and security credentials via the
omniroutebinary. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
omniroute combo suggest --task "<task>"command provides an attack surface where untrusted data (task descriptions) could influence the agent's behavior or tool output. - Ingestion points: Untrusted text provided to the
--taskflag inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the task text as data only.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess execution of the
omnirouteCLI and network-connected API interactions. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the task input.
Audit Metadata