review-prs-cx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests pull request descriptions, metadata, and code diffs from external contributors. These inputs are used to generate reports and propose code changes that the agent then commits and merges. A malicious contributor could attempt to embed instructions within a PR to manipulate the agent's actions during the fix application or merge phases.
- Ingestion points: Ingests untrusted data via
gh pr viewandgh pr diffin Step 3. - Boundary markers: A mandatory human-in-the-loop (HITL) checkpoint is defined in Step 6, requiring user approval before the agent proceeds to modify code.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write files, execute
git commit,git push, andgh pr mergein Steps 7 and 8. - Sanitization: No automated sanitization or filtering of the ingested PR content is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to manage the development environment, including
npm install,git remote, andgh pr edit. While standard for development workflows, these commands modify the local environment and the remote repository state. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
node -pin Step 2 to dynamically evaluate JavaScript code for the purpose of parsingpackage.jsonand calculating version increments.
Audit Metadata