cro-roadmap-red-team
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill attempts to override platform security boundaries by specifying a bypass mode for its sub-tasks. Evidence:
phases/rederive.mdandSKILL.md(Phase 2) explicitly instruct the task runner to usemode: "bypassPermissions". This is a directive to circumvent permission checks or user confirmation prompts for actions taken by the subagents. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes complex project data without sanitization or boundary markers. Ingestion points:
phases/resolve.md(Step 1.3) reads roadmap files and cited evidence sources into the agent context. Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to treat the ingested roadmap data as untrusted content. Capability inventory: The agent can read and write to the file system and execute sub-agents via theTasktool. Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping logic is defined for the external inputs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically spawns and manages sub-agents to perform complex reasoning tasks. Evidence:
phases/rederive.mddescribes spawning 'skeptic subagents' using theTasktool with theopusmodel to perform refutations and re-derivation of hypotheses.
Audit Metadata