day-one-patch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from multiple external sources that could be influenced by an attacker to manipulate agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Reads repository-local instructions (
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md), bug reports (production/qa/bugs/*.md), and general project documentation. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts are defined for the files read during the scoping or implementation phases.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash,Write,Edit, andTask(agent spawning) tools acrossSKILL.mdandreferences/claude-skill.md, allowing for file modification and command execution based on the processed data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content ingested from bug reports or markdown files before it is used to guide the implementation of fixes.
Audit Metadata