dev-story
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple external sources including story files, requirements (TR registry), and Architecture Decision Records (ADR). Maliciously crafted content within these documents, such as instructions hidden in 'Acceptance Criteria' or 'Implementation Notes', could potentially influence the behavior of the programmer agents utilized by the skill.
- Ingestion points: Reads story files from paths provided in arguments or session state, as well as
docs/architecture/tr-registry.yamland ADR files indocs/architecture/. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to use delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers when processing the content of these story or ADR files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad access to the
Writetool (for modifying projectAssets/andPackages/), theBashtool (for executing verification commands), and theAgenttool (to delegate tasks to sub-agents). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation mechanisms are described for the content of the ingested documents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the
Bashtool to execute tests and verification scripts (e.g.,unity-test-verifier). While standard for development workflows, this execution capability represents a risk if an attacker successfully injects malicious instructions through the ingested documentation.
Audit Metadata