retrospective

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the Bash tool to run git log. Specifically, in references/claude-skill.md, it directs the agent to "Adjust the --since date to match the sprint duration if known from the sprint plan." Constructing shell commands by interpolating values directly from repository files (which may be attacker-controlled in scenarios like malicious Pull Requests) without explicit sanitization or validation creates a risk of command injection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing data from various local sources.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads sprint plans (production/sprints/), milestone definitions (production/milestones/), status files (production/sprint-status.yaml), and git logs.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or protective wrappers when processing these inputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Read, Glob, Grep, Write, Bash, and AskUserQuestion tools.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The instructions do not mandate any escaping or validation of the data extracted from the repository before it is used to generate reports or execute commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 02:48 PM