retrospective
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
Bashtool to rungit log. Specifically, inreferences/claude-skill.md, it directs the agent to "Adjust the--sincedate to match the sprint duration if known from the sprint plan." Constructing shell commands by interpolating values directly from repository files (which may be attacker-controlled in scenarios like malicious Pull Requests) without explicit sanitization or validation creates a risk of command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing data from various local sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads sprint plans (
production/sprints/), milestone definitions (production/milestones/), status files (production/sprint-status.yaml), and git logs. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or protective wrappers when processing these inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Glob,Grep,Write,Bash, andAskUserQuestiontools. - Sanitization: Absent. The instructions do not mandate any escaping or validation of the data extracted from the repository before it is used to generate reports or execute commands.
Audit Metadata