team-combat
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon data from external repository files, which can influence its behavior and orchestration logic.
- Ingestion points: The workflow specifically instructs the agent to read
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,production/review-mode.txt,.claude/docs/technical-preferences.md, and other path-scoped project documents to determine its behavior and configuration (e.g., review modes, technical preferences). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or XML-style delimiters to separate the skill's core logic from the content of the ingested files, increasing the risk that instructions inside those files could be interpreted as system-level commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to a powerful toolset including
Bash,Write,Edit, andTask(sub-agent spawning), which provides a significant impact vector if the agent is manipulated by instructions embedded in the repo-local files. - Sanitization: There are no defined sanitization, filtering, or validation steps for the content read from the repository files before it is used to guide the orchestration process.
Audit Metadata