team-ui
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from various repository-local files to guide the UI design and implementation pipeline.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
production/review-mode.txt,design/gdd/game-concept.md,design/player-journey.md,design/ux/interaction-patterns.md, anddesign/accessibility-requirements.mdinreferences/claude-skill.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between data and potentially malicious instructions within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill is permitted to use
Bash,Write,Edit,Task, andTodoWritetools, providing a significant capability surface for actions triggered by processed data. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or filtering for the content read from the external documentation files before interpolation into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly allows the use of the
Bashtool and theTasktool for delegating work to subagents. While these are part of the intended orchestration functionality, they represent a powerful execution environment that could be targeted by the aforementioned indirect prompt injection vector.
Audit Metadata