test-setup

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is explicitly instructed to ingest and follow repository-local instructions from multiple sources, which may be controlled by an external actor in a shared repository environment.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, the nearest path-scoped instructions (e.g., Assets/CLAUDE.md), ProjectSettings/ProjectVersion.txt, Packages/manifest.json, Packages/packages-lock.json, and various asmdef files or existing tests.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts within these files are defined.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted powerful capabilities including Bash, Write, and Edit tools via its configuration.
  • Sanitization: There are no sanitization or validation steps mentioned for the content read from these repository files before the agent acts upon them.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflows involve executing shell commands to verify the environment and project state, including using the Unity CLI for status checks and test execution.
  • Evidence: Phase 4 in references/claude-skill.md utilizes unity status --json and other CLI interactions to validate the installation and runtime environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install external tooling if it is missing from the environment.
  • Evidence: references/claude-skill.md states: 'If it is missing, install the official CLI under the standing authorization before continuing.' While targeting official Unity tools, this pattern involves fetching and executing code from broad network sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 02:47 PM