test-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is explicitly instructed to ingest and follow repository-local instructions from multiple sources, which may be controlled by an external actor in a shared repository environment.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md, the nearest path-scoped instructions (e.g.,Assets/CLAUDE.md),ProjectSettings/ProjectVersion.txt,Packages/manifest.json,Packages/packages-lock.json, and variousasmdeffiles or existing tests. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts within these files are defined.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted powerful capabilities including
Bash,Write, andEdittools via its configuration. - Sanitization: There are no sanitization or validation steps mentioned for the content read from these repository files before the agent acts upon them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflows involve executing shell commands to verify the environment and project state, including using the Unity CLI for status checks and test execution.
- Evidence: Phase 4 in
references/claude-skill.mdutilizesunity status --jsonand other CLI interactions to validate the installation and runtime environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install external tooling if it is missing from the environment.
- Evidence:
references/claude-skill.mdstates: 'If it is missing, install the official CLI under the standing authorization before continuing.' While targeting official Unity tools, this pattern involves fetching and executing code from broad network sources.
Audit Metadata