laravel-vector-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a 'MANDATORY' agent workflow section that directs the AI to spawn specific sub-agents (e.g.,
fuse-ai-pilot:explore-codebase,mcp__context7__query-docs) before and after implementation. While these appear to be vendor-specific tools related to the author 'fusengine', the use of mandatory directives to force specific tool execution is a pattern that overrides standard agent autonomy. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the processing of untrusted user data for vector search, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed content contains instructions that the LLM might follow during retrieval or embedding phases.
- Ingestion points: User-provided content is ingested via the
VectorSearchService::ingest,VectorSearchService::search, andreembedmethods as shown inreferences/templates/VectorSearchService.php.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings are implemented in the provided PHP templates to separate user data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes database writing capabilities (
Document::create,Document::updateinDocument-model.php.md) and makes external requests via theLaravel\Ai\EmbeddingsSDK to generate vectors. - Sanitization: The implementation relies on standard Laravel Eloquent protections for SQL injection, but does not explicitly sanitize the text content before it is sent to the AI embedding provider.
Audit Metadata