laravel-vector-search

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a 'MANDATORY' agent workflow section that directs the AI to spawn specific sub-agents (e.g., fuse-ai-pilot:explore-codebase, mcp__context7__query-docs) before and after implementation. While these appear to be vendor-specific tools related to the author 'fusengine', the use of mandatory directives to force specific tool execution is a pattern that overrides standard agent autonomy.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the processing of untrusted user data for vector search, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed content contains instructions that the LLM might follow during retrieval or embedding phases.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided content is ingested via the VectorSearchService::ingest, VectorSearchService::search, and reembed methods as shown in references/templates/VectorSearchService.php.md.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings are implemented in the provided PHP templates to separate user data from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes database writing capabilities (Document::create, Document::update in Document-model.php.md) and makes external requests via the Laravel\Ai\Embeddings SDK to generate vectors.
  • Sanitization: The implementation relies on standard Laravel Eloquent protections for SQL injection, but does not explicitly sanitize the text content before it is sent to the AI embedding provider.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 06:13 AM