lead-orchestration

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a 'Learn' procedure (Step 8) that instructs the agent to write user-provided corrections directly into its own source code or rule files. This allows changes to the agent's logic to persist across sessions, creating a risk for long-term behavioral poisoning.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The orchestration logic in SKILL.md (Step 3) and references/brief-template.md explicitly allows for the reading and writing of 'protected paths' such as ~/.claude and ~/.codex. These directories are known to store sensitive session tokens, configuration, and internal platform state.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user requests verbatim and uses them to generate instructions for other agents, creating a significant injection surface.\n
  • Ingestion points: User input is captured in the 'Intake' step and stored in the 'Owner request' field of the brief template.\n
  • Boundary markers: The brief template uses markdown blockquotes to isolate user requests.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform file writes, modify its own rules, and access restricted system directories.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the owner's request is performed before it is used to modify the agent's behavioral rules.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Step 6 of the orchestration logic encourages the agent to resolve obstacles by running 'scriptable sources' or existing user scripts, which involves executing code on the host system.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The 'Learn' mechanism (Step 8) involves the runtime generation and application of new instructional code (rules) into the agent's skill library.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 12:30 PM