mcp-tools
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides installation instructions for two external NPM packages:
xcodebuildmcpand@kimsungwhee/apple-docs-mcp. These resources are maintained by individual community members (cameroncookeandkimsungwhee) rather than recognized software organizations or the skill's vendor.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes configuration snippets that usenpx -yto download and execute these MCP servers. While this is standard for MCP delivery, it involves the execution of remote scripts from unverified third-party sources on the host system.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface by instructing the agent to ingest and process large amounts of external content, including framework documentation and WWDC session transcripts (2014-2025). - Ingestion points: Data is pulled through the
apple-docsMCP server tools (e.g.,Search Documentation,Search WWDC Sessions, andGet Sample Code). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or boundary markers to help the agent distinguish between its system instructions and the untrusted documentation content it retrieves.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted significant system capabilities through the
XcodeBuildMCPserver, including discovering projects, performing build operations, and cleaning directories, which could be misused if influenced by injected data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation performed on the retrieved documentation data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata