git-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes shell script templates that interpolate a PR identifier into CLI commands (e.g.,
gh pr checks "$pr"). This creates a vulnerability surface where untrusted input could lead to command injection if not properly sanitized.\n- Ingestion points: The PR identifier, typically sourced from tool outputs or user instructions, is placed directly into a bash variable assignment (pr=<pr>).\n- Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the PR identifier as literal data or to ignore embedded control characters.\n- Capability inventory: The skill usesgitandghtools to push code, create PRs, and perform merges.\n- Sanitization: While the script uses double quotes around variables ("$pr"), there is no validation of the PR identifier's content to ensure it is a numeric ID or a valid branch name before it is executed as part of a shell command.
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