agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external websites via the
agent-browser openandagent-browser snapshotcommands. This content is processed by the AI agent to determine subsequent actions, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious website could attempt to override the agent's instructions. - Ingestion points:
agent-browser snapshotandagent-browser get textreturn raw web content to the agent context. - Boundary markers: The documentation suggests basic headers (e.g., 'Page:', 'URL:') but does not specify robust delimiters or sanitization for the ingested text.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows execution of the
agent-browserCLI, which includes navigation, interaction, and data extraction. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of web content is mentioned before it is returned to the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool supports the
file://protocol in theopencommand, which allows the agent to read local files from the host system. While a standard browser feature, this could be exploited to expose sensitive local data if the agent is misdirected. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
agent-browser evalcommand allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context. This is a powerful feature that could be used to manipulate page state or bypass client-side security controls if the agent is compromised or tricked. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill facilitates the handling of sensitive session data through the
agent-browser state saveandagent-browser cookiescommands. The documentation correctly identifies these as sensitive and advises against committing state files to version control, which is a standard security practice for this type of tool.
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