editor-pass
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content, such as PRDs, tickets, and code files, as part of its quality review process. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed files contain instructions designed to manipulate the reviewer agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdspecifies reading "The work" (file paths, saved pages, screenshots) and "The point of view" (PRODUCT.md, PRD, or tickets) into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The skill provides a strict template and instructions for the sub-agent to "Return only the crit sheet, in the exact format from crit-sheet.md." Additionally,
SKILL.mdincludes an explicit security warning to never paste returned text directly into a shell command. - Capability inventory: The reviewer sub-agent is explicitly configured to be read-only with no shell or network access. The main agent executes a local validation script (
check_crit.py) which performs text analysis only. - Sanitization: The
scripts/check_crit.pytool validates the output format using regular expressions, ensuring the response adheres to the expected structure before it is presented to the user. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the execution of a local Python script to validate the results of the sub-agent's review.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to executepython3 <skill-dir>/scripts/check_crit.py <scratch-dir>/crit-sheet.md. - Evidence: The test file
scripts/test_check_crit.pyusessubprocess.runto invoke thecheck_crit.pyscript for verification. This is a standard testing practice and involves only local, known code.
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