qa-verification
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution to set up and interact with the project environment and external services.
- Evidence: The skill executes local project setup and development scripts such as
bin/setup,bin/dev, and uses configuration files likedocker-compose.ymlorProcfile(as seen inSKILL.mdandreferences/running-the-code.md). - Evidence: Interaction with Jira is performed via the
acliCLI tool to create and view work item comments (found inreferences/report-format.md). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources to define its operational criteria.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read acceptance criteria, stakeholder comments from Jira ticket threads, and pull request descriptions or commit logs from git history (
SKILL.mdsections 2 and 5). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested ticket data or git history.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (e.g., project scripts,
acli), perform API requests, and drive browser automation (Chrome) (references/running-the-code.md). - Sanitization: There is no requirement or logic provided to sanitize or filter the external content before it is processed by the agent to determine its next steps.
Audit Metadata