wayfinder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external, collaborative sources (issue trackers) to guide its logic and tool selection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads the
## Notesand## Destinationsections from a 'Map' issue (stored indocs/map.md, GitHub, or Jira) and the## Questionfield from individual ticket issues. These sources are externally editable and untrusted. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to treat issue content as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within these sections. The prompt explicitly allows 'Notes' to 'override' existing logic and 'carry execution into the map itself.'
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform file read/write operations in the
docs/directory, execute commands using the GitHub CLI (gh), interface with Jira via the Atlassian MCP, spawn sub-agents for research, and invoke various functional skills like/prototypeand/grilling. - Sanitization: The skill does not validate or sanitize content retrieved from the issue tracker before using it to influence its execution path.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ghCLI to automate issue management. While this is a standard developer tool, the agent's use of it is driven by potentially untrusted data from the issue tracker, which could be exploited by an attacker to manipulate repository state or perform actions on the user's behalf.
Audit Metadata