github-pr-merge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands using the
gh(GitHub CLI) andgittools to perform repository operations. - Evidence: The skill uses
gh pr view,gh api,gh pr checks,gh pr merge,git log,git diff, andgit checkoutto interact with GitHub resources and the local file system. - Impact: These commands are used for PR validation, merging, and cleanup. While powerful, they are gated by a mandatory user confirmation step in the workflow.
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a platform-specific feature to execute a shell command at the moment the skill is loaded.
- Evidence: The header contains
!gh pr view --json number,title,state -q '"PR #(.number): (.title) ((.state))"' 2>/dev/null``. - Impact: This command executes silently to provide contextual information in the UI. In this specific instance, the command is benign and targeted at retrieving metadata for the current PR.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could potentially be manipulated by an attacker to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR titles, descriptions, review comments (
gh api repos/$REPO/pulls/$PR/comments), commit messages (git log), and diffs (git diff) inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions telling the agent to treat the content of PRs, comments, or commit logs as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to merge PRs, delete branches, and modify milestone statuses (
gh api ... --method PATCH) across several steps inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the text returned from these external sources before the agent processes it for decision-making (e.g., validating the checklist).
Audit Metadata