debug
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect instructions by processing external data logs.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests
status.message,metrics.jsonl, and trainer logs to identify job failures as described inreferences/triage-paths.mdandreferences/tito-failures.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or warnings to separate log content from agent instructions during processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
firectlCLI,pipfor package management, andpython3for session management as shown inSKILL.mdandreferences/triage-paths.md. - Sanitization: The skill contains instructions to redact credentials and customer identifiers from evidence bundles before escalation in
SKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local CLI tools and package managers for diagnostic data collection.
- Evidence: The skill uses
firectlto retrieve job metadata andpipto ensure the presence of thefireworks-ailibrary inreferences/triage-paths.md. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes short dynamic scripts to manage session state.
- Evidence: The skill employs a
python3one-liner to generate a unique session UUID for telemetry purposes inSKILL.mdandreferences/triage-paths.md.
Audit Metadata