institutional-knowledge

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill references a sensitive file path, C:/Users/<user>/.claude/CLAUDE.md, for modification. This path points to a configuration file within the user's profile directory on Windows. Instructing an agent to access or alter hidden configuration files in user directories is a sensitive operation that exposes local system structure and environment settings.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates multiple file system operations, including creating directories and writing files. It uses a user-supplied name variable to define the target directory path (docs/members/the-<name>/). Without validation, this creates a path traversal vulnerability where an attacker could provide a malicious string (e.g., ../../) to cause the agent to write files to unauthorized locations outside the project directory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a surface for indirect prompt injection by collecting user-provided descriptions and logic to populate skill templates.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters through user-provided names, specialties, and philosophical descriptions during the member creation process in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the user-provided data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write and modify files within the repository and the user's local configuration.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not require validation or escaping of the user-provided content before it is interpolated into the new SKILL.md and README.md files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 8, 2026, 10:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — institutional-knowledge