the-envoy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies the repository's
.git/hooks/directory by installingcommit-msgandpre-pushhooks. These are persistence mechanisms that execute code automatically on developer machines during git operations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and writes GitHub Action workflows to
.github/workflows/. These scripts execute code in remote CI/CD environments (GitHub runners) and can be configured to trigger on various repository events. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive file system operations, including creating provider-specific configuration directories (e.g.,
.claude/skills/,.github/agents/,.cursor/rules/,.windsurf/rules/) and writing multiple reformatted skill files and an audit report (ENVOY_REPORT.md). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from local files and propagates it across different agent runtimes.
- Ingestion points: Reads all
SKILL.mdfiles within themembers/directory as source material for translation. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill performs direct content extraction and reformatting (e.g., removing YAML frontmatter) without adding delimiters or warnings to the output files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant file-write capabilities, including access to restricted directories like
.git/hooksand.github/workflows. - Sanitization: None identified; the skill assumes all content in the
members/directory is safe and adheres to expected formats.
Audit Metadata