the-mailman
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to its handling of external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data through the 'Content Scheduling' and 'Cross-Posting Workflow' processes, specifically by reading source files like './content/blog/my-post.mdx'.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters (such as XML tags or triple quotes) mentioned to separate ingested content from the agent's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including reading local files and making network requests to external APIs (Twitter, LinkedIn, Dev.to, SendGrid).
- Sanitization: The process lacks specified steps for sanitizing or escaping ingested content before the agent summarizes or transforms it for delivery, allowing potential embedded instructions in the source files to influence agent behavior.
Audit Metadata