literature-survey
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes an external Python script (
lit_search.py) located in a sibling directory (~/.claude/skills/literature-search/). The execution command is constructed using parameters (lit_py,lit_skill_dir) defined in theloop.run.yamlconfiguration file.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions mention installing a missing sibling skill (literature-search). This implies fetching and executing external code that is not part of the skill's own package.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a risk of indirect prompt injection as the skill retrieves data from the web and academic sources (arXiv, Semantic Scholar) and processes it to extract claims and snippets without explicit sanitization or defensive boundary markers.\n - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
lit search,lit snippet,lit fulltext, andWebFetchoperations as defined inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify the use of protective delimiters when inserting retrieved snippets into the agent's context.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute subprocesses via
python3and write files to the local filesystem (matrix.json,survey.md,ledger.tsv).\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill emphasizes extracting "verbatim" snippets, which may include malicious instructions from the source documents.
Audit Metadata