purple-team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes arbitrary user-defined commands specified in the
loop.run.yamlconfiguration file to drive the hardening loop. - Evidence: Executes
<target_cmd>,<oracle_cmd>, and<gate_cmd>to interact with the system under test. - Evidence: Utilizes
gitandghCLI commands to manage code changes and create pull requests for the generated patches. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests the installation of external sibling skills provided by the same author.
- Evidence: Instructs the user to run
npx skills add gaasher/agent-loop-skillsif required dependencies are missing. These are identified as vendor-owned resources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves processing adversarial data, which creates an inherent surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Adversarial inputs generated during the red-team phase (stored in
failures.cycle<N>.jsonl) are processed by the agent during the blue-team (fix) phase and passed to the<target_cmd>. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the adversarial payloads being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
target_cmd,gh) and perform file system writes (target_files). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the adversarial input is described in the orchestration instructions.
Audit Metadata