red-team
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
tools/harness.pyscript usessubprocess.runwithshlex.splitto execute the--targetand--oraclecommands. Whileshlex.splitmitigates simple shell injection, the skill's setup instructions inSKILL.mdrely on the agent to infer or ask for these command strings. If an attacker provides a maliciously crafted command string, it could lead to arbitrary code execution within the agent's environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to generate adversarial inputs to test guardrails. While intended for authorized security testing, the
Attack toolkitsection inSKILL.mdexplicitly instructs the agent to create payloads involving obfuscation (unicode homoglyphs, encoding), paraphrasing, and context embedding. These are standard techniques used in prompt injection attacks, and the skill provides a structured loop to refine these bypass methods. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While no direct exfiltration was detected, the
harness.pyscript facilitates the reading and writing of arbitrary files specified via CLI arguments (--inputs,--log). In an environment where the agent has access to sensitive files, a maliciously configuredloop.run.yamlcould be used to read sensitive data as 'candidates' and log them to a user-accessible file.
Audit Metadata