stitch-ideate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web using
WebSearchandWebFetch(e.g., analyzing competitor sites and design trends) to influence its design recommendations.\n - Ingestion points:
WebFetchcalls on competitor marketing sites andWebSearchfor category trends within the 'Research Engine' and 'Design Research' phases.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions suggest summarizing findings, but do not mandate the use of technical delimiters or explicit 'ignore instructions' markers when incorporating fetched data into the prompt context.\n
- Capability inventory: Access to
Bash(shell),Write(file system),Agent(sub-agent spawning), andstitch*:*(UI generation).\n - Sanitization: No specific content sanitization logic is defined for the fetched external content.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines and uses a Bash helper
ss()to execute a session management script (stitch-session.mjs) using Node.js.\n - Evidence: The
ssfunction inSKILL.mdwraps calls to a local JavaScript script for state management.\n - Risk: The pattern
printf '%s\\n' \"<content>\" | ss append-prdinvolves interpolating user-derived content directly into a Bash command string. If the LLM does not properly escape characters like backticks or dollar signs in the<content>variable, it could lead to command injection within the agent's shell environment.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a session state mechanism that writes data to the local file system at~/.stitch/session/prd-draft.mdto maintain state across context compactions.
Audit Metadata