stitch-mcp-edit-screens
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a design refinement workflow that ingests and processes suggestions provided by an external MCP tool, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. If the external tool's output is compromised, it could influence the agent's subsequent actions.
- Ingestion points: The
promptargument (user-controlled) and theoutput_componentsfield from the tool's response as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions are provided to help the agent distinguish between its own system instructions and potentially malicious instructions embedded in the external tool's feedback.
- Capability inventory: The skill execution environment is configured with access to
stitch*:*,Bash,Read, andWritetools viaallowed-tools. - Sanitization: There is no documented validation or sanitization of the text contained within
output_componentsbefore it is presented to the user or used to trigger subsequent tool calls.
Audit Metadata