stitch-react-native-components
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted HTML data from external URLs or local files and uses it as the structural and visual reference for generating React Native application code. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in the source markup could influence the AI agent to produce insecure, backdoored, or otherwise compromised code.
- Ingestion points: The file
temp/source.html, which is populated by thefetch-stitch.shscript or direct file copy, serves as the primary data source for the agent. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings to prevent the agent from following natural language commands found within the source HTML.
- Capability inventory: The agent has
Writepermissions to create and modify project files,Readpermissions to access the ingested data, andBashexecution capabilities via the downloader script. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the source content before it is processed for code generation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes a custom shell script (
scripts/fetch-stitch.sh) that wrapscurlto download content from arbitrary URLs. While designed to fetch UI designs, this allows the agent to perform network requests to non-whitelisted or sensitive internal endpoints if directed to do so by a user or malicious design metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing a local Bash script to perform its primary downloading task. This execution of local shell scripts is a high-privilege action within the agent environment.
Audit Metadata