stitch-setup
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to run
npx @booplex/stitch-kitfor a "Quick install." This command downloads and executes a package from a third-party scope (@booplex) that does not match the skill author's name (gabelul) or any established trusted provider. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the user to install a plugin directly from a remote Git repository using
/plugin marketplace add https://github.com/gabelul/stitch-kit.git. This repository is owned by the skill vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In the troubleshooting section, the skill suggests executing a local script using
bash scripts/fetch-stitch.sh "[url]" "temp/output.html"to handle file downloads. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes outbound connections to official Google services, including
stitch.googleapis.com,storage.googleapis.com, andaccounts.google.comfor API communication, file storage, and authentication. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its orchestration workflow.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes user-supplied design requests (e.g., "Use Stitch to design a simple login screen") in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None are present in the provided examples to separate user instructions from system commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash,Read, andWritetools, along with MCP tools likecreate_projectandgenerate_screen_from_text. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before passing user data to the generation tools.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata