stitch-setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to run npx @booplex/stitch-kit for a "Quick install." This command downloads and executes a package from a third-party scope (@booplex) that does not match the skill author's name (gabelul) or any established trusted provider.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the user to install a plugin directly from a remote Git repository using /plugin marketplace add https://github.com/gabelul/stitch-kit.git. This repository is owned by the skill vendor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In the troubleshooting section, the skill suggests executing a local script using bash scripts/fetch-stitch.sh "[url]" "temp/output.html" to handle file downloads.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes outbound connections to official Google services, including stitch.googleapis.com, storage.googleapis.com, and accounts.google.com for API communication, file storage, and authentication.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its orchestration workflow.
  • Ingestion points: The skill processes user-supplied design requests (e.g., "Use Stitch to design a simple login screen") in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None are present in the provided examples to separate user instructions from system commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash, Read, and Write tools, along with MCP tools like create_project and generate_screen_from_text.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before passing user data to the generation tools.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 09:01 PM