trackers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes untrusted data from external project trackers.
- Ingestion points: Ticket titles, descriptions, and comments are ingested from GitHub and Linear via MCP tools and the
ghCLI. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when processing external text.
- Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are limited to read-only tracker access and command execution through
gh; write operations and persistence are explicitly forbidden. - Sanitization: The skill mandates that data be normalized into a "ticket brief," which provides basic structural filtering, though no formal sanitization of the input text is performed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
gh(GitHub CLI) tool to retrieve information about issues and pull requests. These operations are limited to read-only "view" commands, such asgh issue viewandgh pr view.
Audit Metadata