github-evidence-kit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
GitClientinsrc/clients/git.pyexecutes system commands viasubprocess.runto perform local git forensics. This implementation includes extensive security hardening measures: - Input validation using strict regex for SHAs and branch names (
_validate_sha,_validate_ref). - Use of
--end-of-optionsto prevent argument injection attacks from malicious repository content. - Environment scrubbing (
_safe_git_env) to drop sensitive or dangerous variables likeLD_PRELOADandGIT_SSH. - Mandatory git configuration overrides via
-cflags to disable dangerous features (e.g.,core.fsmonitor,core.hooksPath,credential.helper) that could be abused by a malicious repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from GitHub sources (issue bodies, pull request descriptions, and commit messages), which presents an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via
GitHubAPICollector(src/collectors/api.py) andGHArchiveCollector(src/collectors/archive.py). - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdincludes explicit instructions for the agent to treat quoted evidence content strictly as data and to ignore any instruction-shaped text within it. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute local git commands, perform network requests to GitHub/Wayback APIs, and write evidence files to a local directory.
- Sanitization: Robust validation of file paths and branch names in the schema (
src/schema/common.py) and percent-encoding of all URL segments in the GitHub client (src/clients/github.py) prevent malicious data from manipulating subsequent system operations or re-addressing API requests to attacker-controlled repositories.
Audit Metadata