video-content-analyst
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/kb-write.shis vulnerable to shell and Python code injection. It uses shell variable interpolation (e.g.,"$TITLE","$TAGS","$HYPOTHESIS") inside a Python heredoc block (`python3 - <<PYEOF ... PYEOF`). Since these variables are derived from untrusted video metadata processed by the agent, a maliciously crafted video title could escape the string context and execute arbitrary Python code during the knowledge base writing process.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Multiple analysis entries in the
knowledge-base/entries/directory (e.g.,2026-03-26_bestia-oscar.md,2026-03-26_burrow-oscar.md) contain hardcoded absolute file paths referencing the author's local environment (e.g.,C:\Users\vip\Downloads\...). This results in the exposure of the author's local directory structure and usernames. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. It is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external data (video files and transcriptions). Malicious instructions embedded in a video's metadata or generated transcription could influence the agent's subsequent actions or the content it writes to the knowledge base.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/extract.shprocesses external video files and generates transcriptions viawhisper. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or scripts to isolate content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell scripts, run
ffmpeg/ffprobe, usepython3, and write files to the local file system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping for the extracted metadata before it is passed to the shell scripts or interpolated into templates.
Audit Metadata