kaggle-learner

Warn

Audited by Socket on Sep 17, 2026

3 alerts found:

Securityx2Anomaly
SecurityMEDIUM
references/knowledge/.archive/nlp.md

This fragment is dominated by ML competition tooling, but it includes explicit, model-driven Python code execution patterns (exec and subprocess running a generated script) derived from LLM output. The shown “safe execution” does not include strong OS-level isolation, making the design effectively unsafe under adversarial influence. In addition, the scraping/synthetic data templates introduce supply-chain integrity risks through unvalidated external/LLM-derived content. No direct credential theft/exfiltration/backdoor is visible, so confirmed malware presence is not established; however, the security risk is high due to RCE capability and dataset poisoning pathways if integrated into real systems.

Confidence: 68%Severity: 86%
AnomalyLOW
references/knowledge/nlp/arc-prize-2025.md

No concrete evidence of intentionally malicious supply-chain behavior (no backdoor, credential theft, persistence, or obfuscated payloads) is present in the fragment itself. The security concern is structural: a synthetic-data pipeline generates code strings via a network LLM call and a subsequent verification stage implies executing/using those strings to generate/transform grids. If the omitted generate_input_grids/execute_transformation implementations execute raw code (eval/exec/subprocess), this becomes a high-impact RCE risk. Additionally, multiple sections send prompt content derived from task/student data to an external API, creating a privacy/data-exfiltration surface depending on what data is included and the deployment settings.

Confidence: 46%Severity: 57%
SecurityMEDIUM
references/knowledge/nlp/aimo-2-2025.md

No explicit backdoor, credential theft, or outbound exfiltration is visible in the shown fragment. However, the module contains a critical high-risk design: it extracts Python code from LLM output and executes it via in-process exec(code, {}) without demonstrably enforced OS-level sandboxing, timeouts, or resource/network/filesystem restrictions. This creates a direct untrusted-content-to-arbitrary-code-execution flow, which can be leveraged for malware execution or data compromise if attacker influence or prompt injection is possible. Additionally, AoPS scraping + LLM extraction increases data poisoning risk for the dataset pipeline.

Confidence: 74%Severity: 84%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Sep 17, 2026, 08:01 AM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/galaxy-dawn%2Fclaude-scholar%2Fkaggle-learner%2F@1e0a7313effd61c6b10d904bf3a9e864a4a51a31cd2b8345d59f80c675c1f87a