latex-conference-template-organizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from user-provided .zip files and conference submission URLs.
- Ingestion points: Receives and extracts .zip archives in Step 1 and fetches content from user-supplied conference links in Step 6 to extract submission requirements.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or safety prompts that would prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the processed LaTeX files or fetched web content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell commands (unzip, find, grep, mkdir, cp, rm) and the ability to write files to the local file system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for filenames or web data before they are used in commands or interpolated into generated files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions rely on several shell commands to manipulate the file system.
- Evidence: Uses bash commands like
unzip,find,grep,mkdir,cp, andrmto restructure the LaTeX project and manage temporary files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to retrieve conference information.
- Evidence: Uses a web fetching capability to access external URLs provided by the user for extracting submission requirements.
Audit Metadata