competitor-alternatives
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data from the web (via BrowserOS) and public review platforms such as G2 and Capterra, which are attacker-controllable sources.
- Ingestion points: Web research and 'Review mining' tasks described in
SKILL.mdwhere the agent is instructed to gather competitor strengths, weaknesses, and common complaints. - Boundary markers: Although the instructions explicitly state that web content should be 'treated as hostile', there are no technical delimiters (like XML tags or clear separators) instructed for the ingested data to prevent the agent from obeying embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill framework provides the agent with terminal access via the
ExecutionProxy Interfaceand persistent file-writing capabilities through theMemoryStore Interface. - Sanitization: The protocol includes a requirement to redact PII and secrets, but it does not specify methods for sanitizing malicious natural language instructions that might be contained within the scraped reviews.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'GLOBAL PROTOCOLS' section in
SKILL.mdmandates the use of anExecutionProxy Interface(prefixing commands withrtk) for terminal actions, specifically mentioning execution of tests such asrtk npm test. - [NO_CODE]: The skill package is composed entirely of Markdown instruction files (
SKILL.md,references/content-architecture.md,references/templates.md) and does not bundle any executable scripts or binaries.
Audit Metadata