copywriting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from users during the context-gathering phase, which could potentially contain malicious instructions aimed at exploiting its execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: User-provided information in Phase 1 (Page Purpose, Audience, Product/Offer, Context) within SKILL.md is processed by the agent to generate copy.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to separate user-provided context from the agent's internal instructions, increasing the risk of the agent following instructions embedded within the data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to use the ExecutionProxy Interface (e.g., rtk npm test) for terminal actions and sequentialthinking / context7 MCP loops as described in the Global Protocols section of SKILL.md.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the input provided by the user before it is used to influence the copywriting output or tool execution.
Audit Metadata