commit-changes
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's workflow (specifically Step 7) instructs the agent to execute repository-defined verification commands, such as unit tests, linters, or build scripts. This pattern involves the execution of code found within the repository, which is external to the skill's own implementation.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted repository data (e.g., file contents, git diffs) to determine commit scopes and generate commit messages.
- Ingestion points: The agent context is populated with output from
git status,git diff, and the content of files in the working tree (SKILL.md, Workflow Steps 1 and 3). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instruction delimiters mentioned in the workflow to separate untrusted repository content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify the local file system (via
git commit,git add, andgit restore) and execute local bash scripts (advance-pipeline-lock.sh) and repository verification commands (Step 7). - Sanitization: The skill relies on the agent performing manual sanity checks (e.g., checking for secrets or accidental logging) rather than automated content sanitization or validation.
Audit Metadata