kata-new-project
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill gathers free-form text from the user during the project initialization process to populate
.planning/PROJECT.md. Since this document is intended to serve as a primary context source for other AI agent skills, it presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are included in the project description. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdPhase 3 (Deep Questioning) collects user descriptions. - Boundary markers: The collected input is stored directly in markdown files without specific delimiters or isolation instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill suite has broad capabilities including file system access and command execution via bash and the GitHub CLI.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is applied to the user's project description before it is stored in the project documentation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates project initialization using a series of bash commands and local helper scripts to manage git repositories, create directory structures, and setup complex worktree layouts.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdexecutesgit init,mkdir, andgh repo create. It also invokesscripts/setup-worktrees.shwhich performs significant file system restructuring, including moving the git directory to a bare repository and removing files from the project root to create a worktree structure. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill creates a GitHub Actions workflow that references established external actions from trusted organizations.
- Evidence:
.github/workflows/release.ymlreferencesactions/checkout@v4,actions/setup-node@v4, andsoftprops/action-gh-release@v2. These are standard, well-known components used for CI/CD automation.
Audit Metadata