kata-review-pull-requests
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from pull request diffs and project files, interpolating them into subagent instructions which can lead to adversarial influence over agent actions.
- Ingestion points: The
diff_content(fromgit diff) andproject_context(fromCLAUDE.md) are read inSKILL.md(Step 7) and passed to subagents. - Boundary markers: The skill uses
<agent-instructions>,<diff>, and<project-context>XML-style delimiters to separate instructions from untrusted data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including merging pull requests (
gh pr merge), committing code to the repository (git commit), and creating new GitHub issues (gh issue create) based on review findings (Steps 10-11 inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the diff content is performed before it is placed within the boundary tags.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local shell commands and GitHub CLI tools as part of its normal workflow.
- Evidence: The skill calls
git diff,gh pr view,gh pr merge, andgh issue create. It also executes internal logic via Node.js (scripts/kata-lib.cjs) and Bash (scripts/manage-worktree.sh). While these are intended functions, they represent a powerful execution environment that could be targeted via injection.
Audit Metadata