fix-github-ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its processing of external log data.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/inspect_pr_checks.py(lines 217 and 228) retrieves GitHub Actions logs usinggh run view --logand the GitHub API. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions in
SKILL.mdor the script to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the processed logs. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute
ghandgitcommands and is explicitly instructed inSKILL.md(Step 7) to implement plans by committing and pushing code changes to the repository. - Sanitization: Log content is analyzed and summarized for the agent without filtering or sanitization of potentially malicious instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/inspect_pr_checks.pyexecutes system commands to interact with the repository host. - Evidence: The script uses
subprocess.run(lines 53, 62, 114) to invoke theghandgitCLI tools. While the implementation follows best practices by using list-based arguments to prevent shell injection, the commands use inputs derived from user arguments and external PR metadata.
Audit Metadata