requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to interact with Git for identifying review scopes and extracting code differences.
- Evidence:
git rev-parse,git log,git status, andgit diffcommands are utilized in bothSKILL.mdand thecode-reviewer.mdtemplate. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The subagent implementation ingests untrusted external data, such as code diffs and requirement documents, which could contain adversarial instructions intended to influence the reviewer's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Variables like
{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED},{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, and{EVIDENCE}incode-reviewer.mdinterpolate external content directly into the agent's prompt. - Boundary markers: The template does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the reviewed code.
- Capability inventory: The agent has shell access to execute Git commands.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is defined for the input variables.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
code-reviewer.mdtemplate generates shell script blocks at runtime by interpolating variables into Git commands. - Evidence: The
Git Review Scopesection incode-reviewer.mdconstructs command lines using the{BASE_SHA}and{HEAD_SHA}placeholders for subsequent execution by the agent.
Audit Metadata