claude-agents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses internal configuration and conversation history files located in the
~/.claude/directory, specifically readingstate.jsonfiles for job metadata and.jsonltranscript files for conversation content. This data is used to provide summaries to the user. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs several system commands for job management:
killis used to terminate background process PIDs,rm -rfis used to delete job directories in thejobssub-folder, andprintfis used to append color-coding metadata to transcript files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A local Python script is executed via a heredoc (`python3
- <<'EOF'`) to parse job state files and generate formatted summaries of active background tasks.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads and summarizes external data sources such as job outputs and conversation transcripts.
- Ingestion points: Files located at
~/.claude/jobs/*/state.jsonand~/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonl. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands during the summarization process.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to file deletion (
rm), process termination (kill), file modification (printf), and local script execution (python3). - Sanitization: There is no explicit instruction to sanitize or escape data before processing.
Audit Metadata