critical-thinking-task-designer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates untrusted user data into its prompt instructions without proper isolation or sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided inputs including
topic,student_level,critical_thinking_focus,subject_area,student_profiles,task_format, andtime_availableare interpolated into the prompt (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. User input fields are placed directly after bold text headers (e.g., 'Topic: {{topic}}') without delimiters such as triple quotes, XML tags, or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill is limited to text generation and does not define any capabilities for subprocess execution, file writing, or network operations in the provided SKILL.md.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation, filtering, or escaping of the user-provided data before it is processed by the language model.
Audit Metadata